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A great nation? The changing place of religion in law
and society in colonial and contemporary Australia:
reflections on Douglas Murray in an Australian
context
Michael Quinlan
“Leave your country, your kindred and your father’s house for
a country which I will show you; and I shall make you a great
nation.” (Gen. 12:1–2 NJB)

This paper discusses the role of Christian theology in Australian law and society
in the period after the arrival of the First Fleet and in contemporary Australia.
It argues that Christian theology was foundational to the Australian colonies.
Whilst the theology of Australia’s Christians has always been divided doctrinally, a shared knowledge and understanding of Christianity provided the vast
majority of colonists with a common understanding of the world and a common
language of discourse about it. This understanding was not shared by the indigenous peoples who had their own cultures, traditions, and understandings of
the world and their own languages and laws. Whilst a belief in the sacred was
a common characteristic of the belief systems of the old and new inhabitants of
the continent, each had different ways of understanding the world, the sacred,
and the land. This incongruity, combined with a general lack of willingness or
interest of the new arrivals to understand or recognise the value of the cultures,
traditions, and understandings of the original inhabitants of the continent,
was at least one cause of conflict between them. This conflict still has not been
adequately resolved.
After a consideration of the place of religion in law and society before
and after the arrival of the First Fleet, the paper shifts its focus to contemporary Australia. Until quite recent times, only a small minority of the people
who came to Australia after the arrival of the First Fleet were from religious
Professor Michael Quinlan is Dean of the School of Law, Sydney at The University of
Notre Dame Australia.
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traditions other than Christianity and very few disclaimed any religious belief.
Today the environment is quite different. Largely due to immigration, there are
a growing number of adherents of non-Christian religious traditions now living
in Australia. In addition, there is an increasing proportion of the population
who consider themselves as having “No Religion” and a consequential growth
in identity politics. This article explores the implications of these changes with
particular consideration of Douglas Murray’s views, espoused in his two most
recent books: The Strange Death of Europe (2018) and The Madness of Crowds
(2019). The argument of this article is that there are limits to the law’s ability
to force people with such disparate viewpoints and beliefs to live together in
relative harmony. This harmony can only be achieved if people are willing to
recognise and accept difference.

I. In the beginning: Australia before and after the arrival of the First Fleet
People were living in Australia for over 60,000 years before the First Fleet arrived.
Between 400,000 and 1.5 million people were already living in Australia in 1788.1
There were hundreds of clans with distinct languages, traditions, practices, and
laws. Each clan had its own deeply spiritual relationship with the particular land
and places where they lived.2 Each had organisational structures, rites of passage,
responsibilities, formation, and obligations. Their spirituality, law, custom,
ceremony, art, land, and place were interconnected and inseparable. The land
was their spiritual homeland filled with evidence of individual and ancestral
origins, story, and myth which provided life, forged their identity, and revealed
the sacred.3 Their connection with the land is such that removing Aboriginal
people from their country is to deprive them “of their very soul.”4 Their spiritual
tradition has been described as “a genuine cosmotheandric spirituality” involving “a sacramental vision permeating everything.”5 They had a knowledge of a
God responsible for their creation, the creation of the land and the law.6 They
believed that people had a soul and in eternal life—tthe dreamtime.7 Their
perspective might properly be styled “religious” because life and the world was
given being, meaning, beauty, and order by association with the sacred.8 They
lived what William James characterised as:
The life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible
[consisting] of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our
supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.9

From 1788 onwards, these peoples were forced to interact with new arrivals
on the continent who had a very different understanding of, and relationship
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with, the land. These new arrivals not only had far superior military technology,
they also wanted to occupy, use, and own Aboriginal land.
The new arrivals brought with them a legal system deeply rooted in
Christianity.10 The Christian theology that influenced their understanding of the
world was at least as important as the laws themselves. Unlike the Aboriginal
peoples, the newcomers’ religious beliefs focussed on learnings from written
scriptures as understood within their particular traditions.11 Their scriptures
told of travelling and settling in new lands and used imagery of agricultural
practices with which they were familiar.12 Whilst few at the time recognised this
commonality, including the indigenous peoples, the new arrivals’ perspective
might properly be styled “religious.” The newcomer’s religious traditions also
included organisational structures, rites of passage, responsibilities, formation,
and obligations. Life and the world were given being, meaning, beauty, and
order by association with the sacred as these Christians also lived what James
characterised as “the life of religion.”13 We can only speculate on what the
outcomes might have been had the new arrivals been open to understanding
the Aboriginal peoples’ “life of religion”, their shared sense of the sacred and
transcendent and focused on their common humanity in their interactions.
The reality was different.
Along with their Christianity, the new arrivals brought with them deeply
embedded racism.14 The new arrivals found the cultures and traditions of
the Aboriginal peoples incomprehensible and considering their own culture
intrinsically superior, “rationalised their own lack of comprehension by dismissing Aborigines as sub-human, degraded, or deformed.”15 The colonists
saw Australia as a “waste” land—a terra nullius—that they were destined to
subdue and improve.16 Interpolating in part from Genesis, Locke argued that
land was not property and had no owner unless or until it had been pastured,
tilled, or planted. 17 He also argued that taming the “waste land” was a God
given responsibility.18 Following Locke meant following the well-trodden path
of religious believers bending their scriptures to suit their temporal and political objectives by selective and mischievous reading.19 The same could be said
of those who claimed that the Aborigines had no soul, were not descendants
of Adam and so not fully-human, or who adopted an approach with “absolutely
no biblical justification” considering the Aboriginal peoples to be descendants
of Ham and under the curse of Canaan.20
The first exposure of most Aboriginal peoples to Christianity came with
the arrival of the colonists. It was usually accompanied by dispossession, disease,
65
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and the breaking up of families and clans.21 The new arrivals generally did
not respect the ancient languages, traditions, knowledge of the sacred, faith,
practices, and laws of the people they encountered or consider them to be in
any way equivalent to their own. They expected local customs to change and
the peoples to become what they considered to be “civilised.”22 For example,
the Revered Samuel Marsden, the second chaplain to the colony of New South
Wales, described the Aboriginal people as the most degraded of all human
beings.23 For Marsden they were “ignorant” because they had not heard and
responded to the Gospel. He brought Aboriginal children into his home as
domestic servants hoping for their conversion to Christianity and for them to
become members of the white community.
Missionaries similarly sought to evangelise and to civilise. Some considered
the Aboriginal peoples to have no culture, history or religious traditions.24 Others
considered their religious beliefs to be evil, spiritual darkness.25 They thought
the original inhabitants would be uplifted if they adopted their standards of
living and their Christian beliefs and practices.26 Settlers relied on these beliefs
and on the terra nullius argument to justify their seizure of Aboriginal lands.
To the extent that they relied on any scriptural fiat for their actions, it was a
hollowed-out misreading of the Christian scriptures. It ignored the dignity
of every person created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27) being one in Christ
(Gal. 3:28–29), the Golden Rule (Luke 6:31) and the Biblical admonitions of
stealing (Exod. 20:15), coveting another’s land (Exod. 10:17) and, in its worst
demonstrations, murder (Exod. 20:13). Almost every Christian missionary in
the nineteenth century referred to Acts 17:26 as a proof of the full humanity
of the Aboriginal peoples.27 These Christian scriptures were well known and
not lost in the colonies although imperfectly incorporated into the law and
imperfectly enforced.28 Clearly some Christians among Australia’s colonists
failed to abide by the dictates of their faith. Many crimes against Australia’s
Aboriginal peoples went unpunished. However, it was Christian missionaries
and Christian journalists who publicised and riled against the massacres of
Aboriginal people in Pinjarra, Western Australia (1834), Waterloo Creek and
Myall Creek in New South Wales (1838), and Forrest River in Western Australia
(1926).29 It was a Christian judge (John Plunkett) who presided over the re-trial
of those responsible for the Myall Creek massacre and who sentenced seven
of them to death.30 His religious convictions were transparent in his judgment
where he stated:
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The crime had been witnessed in heaven and could not be concealed.
You had not the fear of God before your eyes, but were moved and
seduced by the instigations of the devil.31

References by a judge to heaven, God, and the devil went unremarked upon
in the nineteenth century. They were unremarkable at the time. Blackstone’s
seminal Commentaries on the Laws of England is full of appeals to the Christian
scriptures.32 He argued that the common law is founded on natural law and the
law revealed by the Christian scriptures.33 There was a shared language and
shared knowledge of the Christian scriptures, and actions considered sinful or
immoral could be judged by that.

II. In the now: contemporary Australia
Today, shared language and knowledge of Christianity are no longer features of
Australian law or society. Whilst some argue that the Catholic understanding of
natural law influenced the reasoning of three of the majority judges of the High
Court of Australia’s 1992 rejection of the terra nullius principle, the judgment
contained no express references to Christianity or to natural law and the contention is contested.34 It is inconceivable that a judge in today’s Australia would
speak as Plunkett did or justify a Court’s reasoning by reference to Christianity.
Sufficient evidence for this is found in the High Court’s 2013 express rejection
of the meaning of the word “marriage” in the Australian Constitution as being
its meaning “in Christendom.”35 Instead, the High Court defined marriage
without reference to the sex or number of persons who might be united in
matrimony.36 This meaning diverged significantly from the meaning envisaged
in the Christian scriptures (Gen. 2:24, Eph. 5:31, Matt. 19:5, Mark 10:7) and the
meaning of marriage previously accepted in common law.37 Something had
clearly changed in the place of Christianity in Australia.
A cause or a symptom of the changing place of Christianity in Australia has
been the decline in the number of Australians who self-identify as Christians.
In the first census in 1911, 96 per cent of Australians self-identified as Christians.
By 2016, this percentage had fallen to 52.1 per cent.38 In recent decades, largely
due to immigration, there has been significant growth in adherents of other
religious traditions, forming 7.8 per cent of the population in 2016.39 The largest
growth has been in those identifying as having “No Religion.” More than 30 per
cent of Australians identified in this way in 2016.40 This category includes those
with no religious affiliation, those with secular beliefs, and those with other
spiritual beliefs.41 These spiritual beliefs are often personal and reject “belief in
a separate transcendent world beyond this world.”42 Despite the trend disclosed
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by the census “religion has not gone away. In the early twenty-first century, it
is a major topic of public conversation—often a deeply polarising one”.43 The
cause of that polarisation and the growth of the “No Religion” category point
to a difference in understanding that is arguably greater than the one that
existed between the colonists and the Aboriginal peoples discussed in I above.
Whilst the colonists and the Aboriginal peoples shared a belief in the sacred
within a context of formation, community, and tradition, in Australia and in
much of the Western world, there has been a growing loss of that belief and
identification. This has been accompanied by an increasing ignorance of—but
more than that an indifference, a lack of respect, interest in, or antagonism
towards—religion.44 The social power of Christian institutions and trust in
them has declined.45 Christian symbols, rhetoric, and ritual are no longer
shared, major aspects of public life.46 The causes for this are many. They include
nineteenth century biblical criticism, Darwin’s theories of evolution, scientism,
prosperity, advances in medical science reducing child mortality and increasing lifespans, the decline of marriage and family life, a loss of confidence in
religious institutions consequent on their failure to properly address the evil
of child sexual abuse, Islamist terrorism perpetrated by the tiny jihadi minority,
a rejection of the moral positions held by some Christian traditions, and the
growth of identity politics.47

III. Reflections on Douglas Murray in an Australian context
In The Strange Death of Europe, Murray voiced a concern about the loss of
Christian faith. His concern was not for lost belief in something true but in the
loss of the “overriding explanation”, “the foundational story” and the inspiration
that Christianity had provided.48 Murray argued that religious certainty and
shared conviction had been replaced by an “existential tiredness”, overriding
uncertainty, deep suspicion of all truths, and the development of confused
philosophy and thought.49 This is a loss of belief in religious institutions and a
loss of the language and shared Christian story.50 Murray saw this as a problem
because the vacuum left could be filled by “almost anything.”51 In The Strange
Death of Europe, Murray was concerned that Muslim immigrants to Europe
would bring with them a certainty of conviction in their own religious faith and
culture that may fill that vacuum.52 Murray considered his observations to be
equally true of Australia.53
In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, the then leader of the Dutch Liberal Party,
expressed concern about Islam in Europe. He argued that Islam is “not only a
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religion, it is a way of life. In this its vision runs counter to the liberal separation
of church and state.”54 Bolkestein’s view, which Murray seems to share, must
assume for its force that all other religions are not “a way of life.” However, it
is a mistake to assume that other religious believers are not living their faith
in their day to day lives. Living religiously may demand the totality of a person
and affect their relationship with everything—symbols, the universe, self and
neighbour.55 As Smith explains:
Even for the most devout, no doubt, much of life is still given over
to the instrumentalist pursuit of “interests”––to building the house
and planting the crops, to working to achieve health and wealth
and power. But those interest-pursuing activities must be performed
within the framework and subject to the constraints of the sacred,
with its injunctions and prohibitions.56

Bolkestein’s statement also suggests that Islam is a religion whose followers
are incapable of existing peacefully within the framework of a liberal state and
uniquely so. It feeds into a narrative of Muslims as the feared “Other” that has
been such a cause of racism, discrimination, and injustice.57 Whilst the reality of
terrorist acts committed by those professing Islamist inspiration might support
this fear, Murray’s own observation that “we may all agree that most Muslims
are law-abiding, decent citizens” undermines it.58 Murray is fearful that Muslim
immigrants may reject the attitudes of the societies to which they move and
become entrenched in their own ways. For Murray there seems nothing in the
religious and cultural traditions of these newcomers, other than perhaps their
cuisine, from which Europeans might learn.59 He leaves no scope for the possibility that Europe’s own religious traditions and attitudes might be reawakened
or enhanced by interaction with people still living “the life of religion.”60 It
might prove to be the case that the world of the newcomers in which children,
marriage, and family life are still highly prized, and pornography, promiscuity,
and adultery distained, provides examples of meaningful lives well lived to
share with Europe and with the other Western destinations where they migrate.
It might prove to be the case that these newly arrived religious believers may
have more in common with some Christians and others still living “the life of
religion” than with those of “No Religion.” This potential appears to be lost on
Murray. He seems concerned that:
The Muslim father does not want his daughter to become like Western
women, because he sees some Western women and knows what
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they do. He does not want his daughter to become obsessed with
consumerist culture when he sees all that it produces.61

Murray ignores the possibility that some Christian fathers might share
similar concerns, that those concerns might have some merit and that an
increase in religious believers living within Europe might have a positive effect.
The teachings of some Christian traditions are themselves in conflict with contemporary Western attitudes to sexual promiscuity, licentiousness, waste, and
consumerism. Rather than considering the extent to which there are similarities in the moral positions held by some Christian and Muslim traditions or
the potential for the revitalisation of religiosity in Europe through encounters
with newly arrived religious believers to the benefit of Europe, Murray argues
that contemporary non-religious Europeans ought to reorient their positions
to engage with and support rather than fight against their Christian heritage.62
Whilst it is true that the sources of the culture of non-religious Europeans
also flow from a Christian source, Murray takes insufficient heed of the impact
of the loss of the sacred and transcendent fertilised within religious traditions
and communities in this call for co-operation or of the gulf between a world
view grounded on the sacred and one grounded on its rejection. As Steven
Smith has observed, it was Christians’ belief in a transcendent standard that
led to the condemnation and abolition of once widespread practices such as
infanticide, gladiatorial combat, and slavery in the West.63 Christianity introduced ideas such as human dignity, human rights, equality, and concern for the
impoverished.64 Given the privation and hardships endured by the colonists,
Williams credits the Christian rejection of suicide as critical for the success of
the Australian colonies.65 However, there has been a steep decline in adherence
to credal statements and in commitment to the institutional life of Christianity.66
Whilst some studies suggest that there may be a growing tendency in the young
to believe in some form of life after death which is not very specific, studies
also suggest that the young are not interested in spiritual matters and prefer “an
immanent rather than transcendent understanding of God (i.e., God in me)”.67
Smith argues that the West has lost its belief not simply in Christianity but in
the sacred and the transcendent.68 Davie argues that significant proportions of
the population continue to “believe without belonging” or regularly participating in formal religious worship and demonstrate some desire for the sacred by
visiting churches and attending pilgrimage sites.69 Whilst this may demonstrate
that some yearn for the sacred this is far from religious belief practised within
a cultural or religious tradition. It is not what James characterised as “the life
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of religion”70 What is clear is that religious belief in credal or orthodox forms
fortified by engagement with regular religious activities is no longer a majority
position in the contemporary West.71 As Davie observes:
The believing Christian attends church to express his or her belief
and to receive affirmation that this is the right thing to do. At the
same time, repeated exposure to the institution and the teaching
necessarily informs, not to say disciplines belief.72

Those who do not live “the life of religion” even if they are on the periphery
of it are not likely to be aligned with those who do. Bruce argues that the lack
of religious knowledge and religious indifference has produced a conception
of religion which reduces it to its simplest common ethical principle which is
to be “nice.”73 This attitude leads to intolerance because it shows no interest in
understanding the motivations or intentions of the religious and without that
understanding “the conservative positions promoted by many Christians (and by
most Muslims) seem narrow-minded and mean.”74 Promoting particular beliefs
or moral codes with which others disagree is not “nice.”75 The West has lost its
respect for customs and traditions born of belief in the sacred and transcendent
which are not just a private matter but are lived out in public.76 This loss has
serious implications for religious believers and the maintenance of religious
freedom in the West. In a world of belief in the sacred and transcendent where
religious faith is not seen as a purely private matter, a liberal state aiming to be
religiously neutral could avoid taking a position on whether any religion was or
was not correct. At the same time, it could acknowledge that a religious belief
might be correct and seek to accommodate that belief where possible.77 Such
a state could accept that God may command, for example, that persons wear
particular attire, not eat pork, not fight in wars, not marry someone of the same
sex, not take contraceptives or not voluntarily terminate their pregnancies. As
a consequence, such a state might avoid compelling its citizens to disobey God
or using the power of the state to punish those seeking to live in accordance
with their religious faith.78 However, in a liberal state which has lost its belief in
the sacred and transcendent and which sees religious faith as a purely private
matter this sort of accommodation makes no logical sense. In such a state the
very idea that there is a higher law or higher power to which a citizen might be
subject has been rejected. Once that has happened religious positions which
do not embrace or endorse, let alone condemn or seek to change the moral
positions taken by others, will be seen as an affront to the dignity of those with
that different and “mainstream” attitude.79 It is, as Cardinal Ratzinger put it “a
71
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dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and
whose ultimate goal consists solely of one’s own ego and desires.” 80 In such a
state accommodating religious believers is unjust and unfair favouritism providing illegitimate excuses for intolerance, bigotry, homophobia, transphobia,
and so on. This is the breeding ground of identity politics.
Speaking of the religious belief of new arrivals from Eritrea, Afghanistan,
Nigeria, and Pakistan, Murray speaks of a possibly fractious future in Europe.81
He calls for cooperation by the non-religious with European Christians but that
call is not currently being heeded. As Davie recognises those who have a passive
attachment to Christianity see seriously held belief as a threat. 82 It is not only
the religious beliefs of Muslim newcomers that are the target of aggression but
those of Christianity—including among Christian immigrant communities.83
Western liberalism is becoming less, not more, tolerant of difference. This is
particularly so where that difference is a form of Christianity less attuned to
the moral zeitgeist. It is those beliefs which are perceived as causing harm and
demands are made not just for their eradication from any remaining vestiges
in the law but for protection from hearing or seeing them. As Robert George
has observed:
The biblical and natural law conception of marriage as the oneflesh union of sexually complementary spouses is not only “alien”
to secular progressives, who understand “marriage” as a form of
sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership, but
nearly incomprehensible—except as a form of bigotry against
people who are attracted to and wish to marry (as progressives
understand the term) people of their same sex.84

Speaking about the United States in 1991, James Davison Hunter, who
popularised the term “culture wars”, identified a division in that country between
those who maintained community with that country’s biblically oriented civil
religion and those who challenged it.85 Hunter observed that the moral conceptions of these people were so different that they each could be described
as living in “a separate and competing moral galaxy.”86 Whilst referring to a
specific context and time Hunter’s phrase seems apt to describe the gulf which
has arisen in Australia and in the West more generally between followers of
traditional Christian precepts and those vehemently opposed to them.
Although Murray does not specifically make this point in The Madness of
Crowds, the void he identified in The Strange Death of Europe has been filled more
by an embrace of identity politics than by any embrace or conflict with Islam.87
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In The Madness of Crowds Murray argues that identity politics has produced a
form of vengeful, liberal dogmatism. He argues that this has atomized society into
different interest groups by presuming that characteristics including sex, gender,
race, or sexual preference were the main or only relevant attributes of a person
with such characteristics.88 In this approach those with certain characteristics
are considered to be victims of oppression within a hierarchy of oppression
and everything becomes political.89 This development of identity politics is
very closely related to the loss of the meaning and certainty of religious faith.90
The loss of religious belief within a tradition does not mean that people
cease to look for meaning in their lives or to ask the big questions of life which
have always engaged human beings such as “What am I doing here? What is my
life for? Does it have any purpose beyond itself?” Levin argues that America’s
“crisis of isolation, division and cultural conflict is in many respects a crisis of
meaning and even a result of a religious hunger left unsated by a culture that
has lost some of its traditional vocabulary of sin and redemption.”91 The search
for meaning remains and for some identity politics provides that meaning. As
Murray opines:
The new metaphysics includes a call to find meaning in this game:
to struggle, and fight and campaign and ‘ally’ ourselves with people
in order to reach the promised land. In an era without purpose,
and in a universe without clear meaning, this call to politicize
everything and then fight for it has an undoubted attraction. It
fills life with meaning, of a kind.92

As Murray observes, the dogmatism of identity politics “is grounded in a
desire to express certainty about things we do not know, and to be wildly dismissive and relativistic about things that we actually do know.”93 He explains
further that:
It is as though the enquiring aspect of liberalism was at some
stage replaced with a liberal dogmatism: a dogmatism that insists
questions are settled which are unsettled, that matters are known
which are unknown and that we have a very good idea of how
to structure a society along inadequately argued lines . . . If only
this liberalism could allow a dose of humility to be injected where
the certainty has prevailed.94

What Murray does not, at least not explicitly, draw out in this book is
that the vengeful, liberal dogmatism of which he speaks is most commonly and
vehemently directed at the moral positions of traditional Christianity which in
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many cases are shared with other religious traditions. This is certainly the case
in Australia. The law cannot control what everyone thinks or says, nor can it
provide recourse to every person who is disparaged or upset by any conversation
or action any more than it has enacted or could enforce the Golden Rule.95 The
law cannot force people with disparate viewpoints and beliefs to live together in
relative harmony.96 This can only be achieved if people—all people—are willing
to recognise and accept difference. The rise of identity politics, the rejection
of the sacred and transcendent and the lack of tolerance of those whose lives
are guided by moral precepts rejected by others, creates a very real conflict in
world views. This conflict may be more difficult to resolve than the challenge
posed by the movement of peoples with different religious traditions into what
were once “Christian nations” like Australia.

IV. The Future: where to from here?
In The Strange Death of Europe, Murray considered a future in which European
contemporary liberal attitudes were recognised as being other than universal.
He considered that future to be likely to be a very painful one for believers in
post-Enlightenment contemporary European liberalism:
More likely is a growing acceptance that people are different, that
people believe different things, and that our own values are not
in fact universal values.97

As he demonstrates in The Madness of Crowds identity politics has made
deep inroads into his earlier vaulted idea of European liberalism with a growing
incivility and unwillingness to listen to rational argument or alternative perspectives. This is also the contemporary Australian experience. The answer for
Australia and for the West requires everyone to exhibit a spirit of generosity
absent from identity politics. As Murray notes:
If people were able to feel some generosity in interpreting the
remarks of others, even of those on an opposing side, then some
lessening of the trench-digging might be possible.98

Living together requires an inquiring mind, a willingness to seek to
understand the positions taken by others and a real tolerance of different understandings of the world. It requires an acceptance at least that others may believe
and have the right to believe in the sacred and transcendent and in customs and
traditions developed within that context and to orient their lives on that basis.
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